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Mijnheer de Rector Magnificus,
Zeer gewaardeerde toehoorders:
Deze oratie zal ik, met uitzondering van de dankwoorden aan het slot, in het Engels uit-
spreken. De reden hiervoor is simpelweg dat mijn benoeming plaats heeft in een ‘inter-
nationaal’ kader, in het bijzonder van een samenwerkingsproject tussen de universitei-
ten van Leiden en Oxford. De inhoud wil ik daarom beschikbaar kunnen stellen voor
Britse collega’s en vrienden, die geen kennis hebben van de Europese taal die
Nederlands heet. Daarom schakel ik over op een minder Europese taal, die echter wel
ons Europees koinè is geworden.1
* * *
The title of the British novelist Graham Greene’s 1934 novel, It’s a Battlefield, is drawn
from lines in A.W. Kinglake’s history of the war in the Crimea.2 Greene’s biographer,
Norman Sherry, comments: ‘The idea of life as a battlefield in which individuals, igno-
rant of the extent of the whole war, fought their own separate battles, is the metaphor
which embodies the theme of the novel.’ Each of us fights his own battles, in – as
Kinglake puts it – ‘happy and advantageous ignorance of the general state of the
action.’3
In Kinglake’s own account the problem is the mist that lies over the battlefield: the
soldiers can’t, so to speak, see the wood for the trees. In Greene’s novel the mist is
metaphorical. His picture of the human condition resembles in one respect that of
Spinoza. Recall Spinoza’s claim that any human individual’s comprehension of the
world is necessarily inadequate just to the extent that it belongs to a particular, there-
fore limited human intellect.4 We all walk around in a relative haze. From a rather dif-
ferent point of view, Hegel argues that, left to his own devices, a human individual can
at best only comprehend – ‘unconsciously’, as he puts it – the ‘universal task’. Most of
us grasp little of what history is using us to bring about.5
That, I suppose, is roughly the position in which many of us find ourselves in respect
to Europe and to the European Union. It’s all pretty murky.
An American author, Melissa Rossi, has remarked that ‘Europeans are absolutely
confused about the European Union’.6 A recent Financial Times editorial noted that not
just individual citizens but nation-States too are confused.7 Europeans – an ex-German
Ambassador wrote – are ‘confused about the roles and representativity of the many
European institutions’.8 A German Member of the European Parliament remarked that
it is indeed ‘easy to be confused about Europe’s institutions’.9 And at a media seminar
in a would-be accession land, in an evaluation of coverage of European news, the diffi-
culty was summed up in a few words: ‘The European integration process [is] totally
unintelligible to normal people.’10 The Brussels haze spreads out over the whole conti-
nent and beyond.
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I shall try today to review a number of themes, belonging to European history and phi-
losophy, in such a way as to drive off some of the fog, at least in patches. I can tell you
very little about the details of the functioning of the European Union which you don’t
already know. So I’ll do something else, namely attempt to put various aspects of
Europe and its intellectual history into a perhaps unexpected light. In this connexion I
shall talk about a number of thinkers who, I believe, have a contribution to make to
study in this area.
One of the commonest ideas about Europe to be found in the philosophical texts of the
last centuries is that Europe stands for the principle of universalism. This idea is still
widespread: the preface to a recent European Commission Forward Studies Unit publi-
cation on European Unity remarks that ‘universalism is a European value and an obli-
gation’.11
Unlike all other continents – but on the universalist view, of which there are of
course many variants, European identity is in any case not essentially defined in
geographical terms – Europe is ‘nothing particular’, just because it transcends all parti-
cularity. This is to be sure only one view, and it remains controversial. But it is a neces-
sary reference in any examination of the idea of Europe, or rather of the ideas of the
diverse Europes which have been or are still in competition.12 Many Europeans have
indeed considered themselves, as the Byzantines did – it is the title of this lecture -
oikoumenes promachoi: champions or front-fighters for the whole world.13
Europe is, from this point of view, the model for the entire world, the future of the
entire world. Or, to put it another way, the task of the oikoumene is to Europeanize
itself. In this sense, Europe has no ‘natural’ frontiers. The non-European is just the not-
yet-European. Europe is another name for cosmopolitanism.
If you don’t like these identifications – for instance because they still resonate with
their historical ‘applications’, colonialism and imperialism of the classic kind – then you
might replace the term ‘Europe’ with that of ‘the West’. The Western world is Europe-
plus – ‘plus America’ etc. But the rest of the world, outside of the West, has also long
been ‘westernizing’ – culturally, politically and legally. Between the West and the East
the relation is not symmetrical: the West (leaving aside sporadic cultural enthusiasms
for China and Japan and so on) has never been tempted by or in danger of
‘Orientalization’.14
All these ideas obviously have a strong mythical component. But political and legal
reality feeds on political and legal fictions.15 The fictions then help feed our confusion.
Our ‘confusion’ about Europe is not just a matter of a defect in understanding – it is the
reflection of an objective problem, or if you like, it is structural.
It is often claimed that any such confusion has to do, in part, with a lack of clarity
about matters of sovereignty. The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia pretty unambiguously
recognized the sovereign power of the individual nation-states. It is this settlement that
is said now to be under pressure, not only as a function of what is called globalization,
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but also as a consequence of European integration and unification. Some commenta-
tors talk in this latter connexion about a ‘transfer’ of sovereignty from the nation-
states to Brussels. Others insist that the Union is a voluntary, treaty-based club and that
the principle of rebus sic stantibus applies. This is a Civil Law doctrine (developed by
ecclesiastical lawyers) according to which new and unexpected circumstances may be
used to argue for withdrawal from treaty obligations. Like Civil Law, Common law has
generally in modern times followed the pacta sunt servanda rule16 – though it contains
certain doctrines, for example that of frustration, which have allowed a contracting
party an escape route. But at the level of international relations it is not entirely clear
that, in the last resort, any doctrine needs to be invoked in order to justify treaty with-
drawal, other than the doctrine of national sovereignty itself.
The problem about where sovereignty lies – and will come to lie – in Europe is illu-
strated by the recent discussion on the European Constitution.
This is, in the view of some legal experts, since it is a constitutional treaty, in fact
not a constitution at all. The British House of Lords Select Committee, in its frame-
work consideration of the Constitutional Treaty, expressed the view that even the arti-
cle dealing with legal continuity – between the old European bodies, the European
Community and the existing European Union on the one hand and the new European
Union on the other – enters ‘uncharted territory’ and is a ‘political minefield’.17 If the
minefield has a fog hanging over it too, there is a real problem.
I should like now to look briefly at a set of broader questions, concerning the legal-cul-
tural background against which such matters of European integration and unification
are played out.
My argument will be that the present and probable future shape of the European
Union is arguably a function of a particular view of State and government and of their
functions, a view now in vogue and sometimes known as ‘contractual governance’.
As the name suggests, this view finds its basis in the application of a certain con-
ception of contract. I try to problematize both the doctrine of contractual governance
and the particular notion of contract which it appeals to. I suggest that this presently
dominant notion of contract may be inadequate and also – a supplementary point rele-
vant to the question of European legal culture – that this same notion is in origin per-
haps not as entirely ‘European’ as we might think.
Let me situate the broader questions at issue by citing a European University Institute
working paper by Christian Joerges on ‘The Law in the Process of Constitutionalizing
Europe’.18
His analysis of the relevance of the European Constitution places it in the context
of the ‘strategies of juridification of the integration project’. The reasons for this juridi-
fication have to do in part with the configuration of European institutions, in particu-
lar with the role of the European Court of Justice, in whose work – the author notes –
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methodology and theory as to the legitimacy of Europe’s constitutional charter are lac-
king. But, more generally, whenever the integration project has been renewed, it was,
he adds, in any case in a direction that ‘tended to confirm a supranational, non-state
legal constitution’.
Community law has, he argues, been employed by the EU to achieve regulatory
ends, especially in respect to the internal market programme. But ‘because the EU itself
... lacks the administrative powers necessary to implement legally-binding rules in
Member States, it has to try to compensate for these shortcomings’. And these attempts
give yet more impetus to juridification.
In this way Europe has become something like what has been called a ‘regulatory
State’19 or a regulatory super-State – if not, perhaps, a post-regulatory super-State20 – in
all of which cases the distinction between public and private spheres is blurred and the
function of government tends ever more often to be substituted by that of (European)
governance.
The juridification of Europe is only to be understood, I want to suggest, in the
framework of an analysis of the general phenomenon of the contractualization of society.
A useful study of this phenomenon has been made by the French academic lawyer
Alain Supiot. Let me summarize his picture.21 It focuses of course on the notion of con-
tract itself – a typically European notion, it may seem. (Japanese society, for instance,
was accustomed – before its importation of German and French codification models –
to consider the ‘western’ principle of contract – the formal binding of the parties, more
or less independently of their changing circumstances – as contrary to the rules of giri,
i.e. rules of social obligation: a much less abstract and more flexible manner than the
European way of dealing with questions of social, including economic obligation.)
However that may be, we are concerned here with the present fashion in political
thinking for ‘contractual governance’. This idea draws both on legal doctrine (on a
‘generalization of the contractual vocabulary’) and also (Supiot argues) on a quite dif-
ferent discipline, in which the concept of regulation plays a central role: namely, mole-
cular biology. This latter provides the key idea of treating living beings as machines
whose environmental adjustment mechanisms can be represented in a formalized
manner. The regulation of human society is then conceived of as a special case of such
adjustment, operating via the formalization of conventions. Human law is theorized as
deriving from, or rooted in, such conventions – and on the voluntary concurrence (the
free will) of those bound by any convention. This provides a basis for the generaliza-
tion of the contractual vocabulary (based on a will theory of contract – a question to
which I will return in a moment). The overarching point here in any case is that con-
temporary doctrines of social contractualization are embedded in an eclectic set of
references or, if you prefer, exploit an eclectic combination of sources, drawn from a
certain theory of law, but also from the biological, the natural and the social sciences.
It is not obvious that the result is very satisfactory.
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The underlying ground of contract is the above-mentioned pacta sunt servanda prin-
ciple: an entirely general principle, of late-mediaeval origin in its elaborated form, un-
known in this form to the original Roman law,22 and rooted in a moral principle – in
fact in religious faith, in faith in Divine Law. (In our times, I shall suggest, something
else takes the structural place of the Divinity.)
Supiot describes the generalization of the contract idea in the following (rather
intricate) terms: ‘The horizontal dimension of exchange or of covenant becomes the
homogeneous and abstract groundwork on which the market economy thrives [only]
if it is accompanied by the vertical dimension of the [so-called] universal guarantor
under whose aegis the formation of contracts [or juridical acts] takes place’.
This account of the contractual relation introduces a category – that of the univer-
sal guarantor – which can be illuminated via the work of the Paris professor of
Administrative law, Pierre Legendre.
In a series of works,23 Legendre has examined the question of the structural conditions
of the operation of law. These concern in particular the need for what he calls a ‘foun-
dational reference’. This reference plays the role, just mentioned, of universal guaran-
tor. The context of the need for such a reference is that law must ‘translate structure
into a system of norms’: it must normalize society. To do so, it must recruit individual
human beings into that system; it must normalize them. This is a ‘psychological’ con-
dition of its successful operation.24 But law itself is not a social science; it is a dogmatics;
that is to say, an institutionalizing discipline.25
Dogmatics, in the standard sense (analyzed in detail by Michael Herberger in his
1988 work Dogmatik),26 is concerned with the articulation of the already mentioned
foundational reference – whether in law or indeed in theology or medicine. Dogma is
the principle and content of institutional rationality. In respect to the human indivi-
dual, it provides a ‘logic of attachment’.
On Legendre’s account, the task of the science of law so understood lies in its role in
knitting together three realms:
- that of the human individual, in his biological existence; that is to say, of the human
body, with all its needs, and the varying social – including formal – conditions and con-
sequences of their satisfaction;
- human desire, which is not the same thing as human need, but revolves around
the affective identification of human individuals with one another via some founding
reference – a God, a leader, an idea, an institution or whatever – and its laws;
- and human society, into which the individual is knitted, inheriting its norms, that
is to say, inserting himself into its culture, which in important part is its legal order.27
Our founding reference in the Europe of the 21st century is, again on Legendre’s
account, no longer a God of the old type, nor even an Emperor or King ruling the
nation by divine right, but ‘the notion of a scientific, rational and welfare-oriented
government’. Our society, he adds, is governed by a set of ‘ultra-modern ideals’, such
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that ‘normativity itself is imprisoned in scientific discourse’ – presenting itself for
example as just such a thing as contractual governance, an arrangement guided by the
ideals of science and of democracy, as well as by the ultra-modern notion of manage-
ment, which he calls the ‘scientific-technocratic version of the theme of natural gover-
nment’ – an idea serving ‘to reassure us that government rests on more than mere
custom’.28
But more importantly, this ultra-modern reference is characterized by an essential
oddity, namely that it denies its own dogmaticity. In this connexion I will quote my
own words, from a recent publication:
‘In reality it is not that we have moved into an era of consistent anti-dogmatism’ –
into a world, in other words, emancipated from ideology – ‘but rather that we have sub-
stituted new dogmas for old.… The organizing core of these new dogmas’ is indeed
their ‘anti-dogmatic pretension’. The content of this contemporary package of ideas is
in principle simple, combining an appeal to (scientific) rationality with a guarantee of
fundamental, ‘self-evident’ rights for all. Such a package ‘recognizes no dogma or
orthodoxy. This is its strength – but also its weakness. For in principle such an attach-
ment can function as an obstacle to self-understanding’, I wrote.29
A measure of understanding is what, in the murky landscape, we are aiming at. Let us
therefore return to the question posed, that of the contractualization of the social bond.
As God once was the universal guarantor of contractual obligation, so in (later)
‘modernity’ the State has come to assume this role. The State becomes the guarantor, as
Third Party warrantee, of the effectivity – via the legitimacy – of the contractual rela-
tion.
The Third Party is here not so much a legal as a meta-legal category: it secures the
causal conditions for the functioning of the legal relation. It is not normative, but meta-
normative. It is responsible for the magical operation – the conjuring trick – through
which power is transformed into legitimacy, with all the consequences at the level of
subjective affectivity, that is to say, of the passions.
Since this is an important point, we should look a little more closely at the general
question of the need for the Third Party reference. This need derives from the human
condition, from how the social and political animals called human beings are and oper-
ate.30 It is recognized, in dogmatic form, in theology and in canon law.31 Just as God is
(for example) Third Party to any marriage, so he is Third Party to any contract, agree-
ment or promise. This is not just a Christian doctrine: something approaching it is
found for instance in the writings, nearly two thousand years ago, of the Talmudic sage
Rabbi Akiva:
‘Akiva explains: A creditor and a debtor or people making business negotiations
don’t make or accept loans or make transactions except with legal documents and wit-
nesses, and thus if somebody lies or denies [the transaction], he lies or denies the
[validity of] the documents and the witnesses. But someone who gives something to his
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neighbour as a pledge [or deposit], doesn’t want anybody to know about it except for
the Third One between them. [In this case], when one denies the transaction, one
denies the Third Party [i.e., God].’32
The legal theorist Hans Kelsen, in his 1922 article on ‘The Concept of the State and
Social Psychology’,33 talks about the modern State as the founding reference, that is to
say, as the power of an idea which allows individuals to identify with one another. Thus
he remarks that ‘social unity – as Durkheim already recognized – has an a priori reli-
gious character, the social bond operating somehow via the intermediary role of the
Divinity…. The concept of the State as a concept of a substance like ‘force’ or ‘spirit’, as
a personalizing fiction, enters in parallel with the concept of God.’34 Kelsen even writes
that ‘the State presents itself as a concept of God’. But this is hardly true of present-day
Western States, at least not at the explicit level. On the contrary: the new dogma is that
the State stands, in its neutrality, above matters of religion and indeed of morality.
There is however a further point. The position of the State is, as we know, now under
pressure from rival, non-State institutions, especially those operating on a global scale
– a striking example being the World Trade Organization, previously GATT, whose
rules are now said to be of application to more than 90% of international trade rela-
tions. Such institutions are even claimed to be in process of assuming the role of (glo-
bal) government. As in the case of the European Union, but against a different histori-
cal and political background, it is said to be a matter of transfers of power and (as I
mentioned) of where sovereignty is coming to lie. I prefer to say that there is a crisis of
sovereignty, external and also internal.
In respect of internal sovereignty, an essential question (hardly posed in the standard
legal and political science literature) is whether the European nation-states are any
longer, in the light of the above-mentioned institutional and ideological developments,
able to fulfil one essential element of their structural task. ‘The motley world of con-
ventions’, Supiot writes, ‘no longer has the State as its unique guarantor’. The conse-
quent incapacitation of the State can, he adds, ‘only be accompanied by a dismem-
bering of the figure of the Third Party as guardian of compacts’.35 And this in an epoch
of contractual governance!
From this point of view there is, in spite of a common opinion, no new ‘planetary
legal order’ given coherence by its attachment to human rights on the one hand and the
free market on the other, but rather a multiplication of diverse references: arguably a
kind of ‘re-feudalization’ of social and of legal relations.36
There is, it appears, a ‘new type’ (or new idea) of contract, which plays a (more or less)
novel political and legal role, offering the basis for an alternative to the older, hierarchical
principle of internal State sovereignty – though in varied and hybrid forms.37 Indeed,
Supiot’s conclusion is that ‘far from designating the triumph of contract over [State] law,
the “contractualization of society” is rather the symptom of the hybridization of law and
of contract’ itself and, again, of ‘the reactivation of feudal-type social bonds’.38
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What I want to suggest is that the present and planned configurations of the European
Union reflect these developments. To repeat the point: Europe has been established –
though not without resistance from various quarters – as a kind of regulatory super-
State. The result is sometimes referred to as a new ‘governance’ structure, as for instan-
ce in the European Commission’s White Paper on European Governance of October
2000. The White Paper is concerned, among other things, with working out ways to
make application of ‘contracts of agreed objectives between the Union, represented by
the Commission, and the authorities with a regulatory or management capability’
(note the terminology).
Christian Joerges argues, more generally, that it is not surprising that the real-life
practices of European government can best be grasped with the concept of ‘govern-
ance’; he even quotes Joseph Weiler’s words about the ‘underworld’ of the European
governance system.39 Another commentator, Lawrence Lessig, speaks in the same con-
nexion of various alternative modes of regulation: combining law with markets; com-
bining law with norms, as in so-called self-regulation; and the ‘hybrid of norms and
law’ called contractual government.40 Indeed, the policy vocabulary is nowadays rich
with new conceptual combinations.
But what does all this mean? In order to begin to answer this question, let us for a
moment take a step back in history, to Hegel. Hegel (writing in 1821) insists that the
State cannot be a contractually-based institution. ‘It is … far from the truth’, he notes,
‘to ground the nature of the State on the contractual relation.’ Indeed, ‘the intrusion of
this contractual relation … into the relation between the individual and the State has
been productive of the greatest confusion in both constitutional law and public life.’41
In this regard I was interested to read a few years ago a piece by the French politi-
cal scientist Gérard Duprat, in which he argues that, precisely from a Hegelian point of
view, the European Community is not a State-like construction, even if it plays, in part,
a government role. Its ‘powers’ ought not even, he suggests, to be called ‘political’. It
functions for the most part outside of any system of representation – and to that extent
its so-called ‘democratic deficit’ is not a fault but lies in the logic of its principles of oper-
ation.42 It does however provide a system of justice and it polices that system; it is orien-
ted to the satisfaction of needs. In short: it is a civil society, in Hegel’s sense. More accu-
rately, it is a management system for civil society. In short, it is contractual govern-
ance. So it is not cut out to play a coherent role as universal, Third Party guarantor.43
The reluctance of the European Union to endow itself with orthodox State-like
powers is indeed, it seems to me, an expression not just of political discretion in the face
of the sensitivities or resistance of the member States but also of the influence of the
presently influential revisionary view of what State-like powers ought to look like.
Some of the EU’s leading figures may indeed even believe that its own assumption of a
governance role will render the old-fashioned nation-State function redundant.
But we no longer, Legendre claims, ‘understand the role played by States in the civilized
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society of the Western tradition, their structural vocation… A long crisis has shaken the
scaffolding of the Third Party guarantor’, which risks casting us into ‘institutional nihi-
lism’.44 I think that there is something in this argument, which deserves serious consi-
deration. If, I wrote in another context, ‘the function of dogma is to knit together the
biological individual and the social institution, within the framework of some system
of … sacrosanct truth’ then ‘it would follow that when the knitting starts to unravel, as
contemporary contractualism causes it to do’ – think of the founding reference of our
Western society, which embraces a paradoxical authorization to break all taboos, that
is, to defy all such references – ‘the barriers are removed to a reintroduction of “social
fantasms of absolute power”. For where lies the limit … when nothing is sacrosanct?’45
This contemporary contractualism – the contractualism of contractual governance –
exploits a modern46 notion of contract. What defines this notion? James Gordley has
demonstrated, in his monograph on The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract
Doctrine, that the evolution of the modern idea of contract was accompanied by a ‘doc-
trinal crisis’. For jurists had abandoned the Aristotelian and mediaeval philosophical
foundations of contract theory without rebuilding ‘the edifice they had razed’. Central
to the modern account is the evolution of the ‘will theory’ of contract.47 But the attrac-
tion of the will theory was not, on Gordley’s account, in essence philosophical. Rather,
will theories had politically attractive consequences. They were especially useful to eco-
nomic liberalism, Gordley writes, which held that government ‘should leave economic
decisions to the market-place’. There was a ‘common commitment’ among lawyers and
political thinkers ‘to building a theory around the idea of [individual] human choice’.
In any case, the abandonment of the Aristotelian and mediaeval doctrine of contract,
with its direct politico-moral content, its theory of virtue and so on, left both lawyers
and philosophers in a position in which they ‘had left no other way to explain’ either
law or morality. If there is no objective moral ground for the rationality of legal and
political institutions, ‘then, it seemed, the source must be the will’.48 And so the will
became the central explanatory but also legitimating element in the new doctrine.49
You may recall that Sir Henry Maine, author of Ancient Law, wrote in 1861 about a
‘movement of the progressive societies … from Status to Contract’.50 But his thought is
more complex than this slogan suggests. What is often forgotten is that, though Maine
was an admirer of Roman law, he insisted (in his chapter on ‘The Early History of
Contract’) that the views of the Roman lawyers were ‘inconsistent with the true histo-
ry of moral and legal progress’. But worse: much later, in modern times, the language
of the Roman lawyers became ‘the language of an age which had lost the key to their
[the Romans’] mode of thought’ – in other words, law, in the technical sense, had
become disjoined from the underlying general legal and intellectual culture. Worse still,
in Maine’s view, was the example offered by the modern Social Contract theorists: ‘It
was’, he writes, ‘for the purpose … of gratifying their speculative tastes by attributing
all jurisprudence to a uniform source … that they devised the theory that all Law had
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its origin in contract’ – this theory being in fact a mere ‘legal superstition’. Interesting
and relevant is also Maine’s description in the same chapter of early feudal society,
which was, he suggests, bound together precisely by the tie of contract – in contrast, we
might say, to the modern, State-based polity. Thus Maine indirectly anticipates the
recent critique of the contractualization of society, namely that this latter involves (I
already mentioned the point) a kind of re-feudalization of social relations.
The idea of the European Union as a contractual governance structure is sometimes
underpinned by a claim to the effect that, after all, it is (therefore) built on a typically
European idea system, namely that of European law and more particularly on the puta-
tive root of that system, Roman law.51 Indeed, it is often suggested that the reference to
Roman law can function as a basis for the intellectual unification of Europe. In this
connexion it is worth saying a few words about the recently published study by the
Turin professor of law Pier Giuseppe Monateri entitled Black Gaius: A Quest for the
Multicultural Origins of the ‘Western Legal Tradition’.52
Monateri’s argument is that the European legal tradition has in fact non-European
roots, which have too long been ignored. According to the theory of the ‘renewal of the
old’ – to use David Johnston’s phrase53 – Roman law has always possessed a special
capacity for self-renewal. Monateri suggests that this theory is in fact ‘intertwined with
the restatement of the project to use Roman law as the common glue with which to
build up a newer law for European countries’ – with which, that is to say, to promote
European legal unity; ‘a project with quite practical implications in the unfolding of
Europe as a cultural alternative to the United States’. What interests Monateri are the
rival theories, including the ‘African-Semitic’ account, which claims that the Middle
East possessed highly developed legal cultures from which ‘the Romans borrowed more
advanced theories than they themselves possessed’.
Particularly relevant from the point of view of our theme are two more specific
arguments:
First, there is the claim that the Romans never developed a general theory of con-
tract, but rather various, pragmatically oriented contract laws, less advanced in fact
than the corresponding Egyptian law: ‘Whereas in ancient Egypt a written document
could easily testify to transfer of possession, a Roman citizen, in case of a transfer of
land, for example, had to walk on the land to take possession!’ Very impractical! So,
Monateri concludes, the so-called survival of Roman law and its continuous ‘renewal’
can in truth only be accounted for on an ideological basis, that is to say as a ‘false cons-
ciousness of society at the service of governance projects’.54
Second, there is a claim concerning the theory of the State and of public law; more
especially, concerning the absence of any such theory in Roman law55 until the emer-
gence of the post-classical Sacred Empire model at the time of the Emperor Diocletian
(in the 3rd century AD). Yet this model was not Roman, that is to say European, but
Oriental in origin! The Emperor now became a sacred figure, owner and God
(Dominus et Deus) of his realms. The essence of this conception of imperial dignity was
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maintained after the Christianization of the Empire: the Emperors, no longer Gods,
nevertheless enjoyed the status of sacral figures, as spiritual leaders of Christendom.
The theory, or rather the dogma, of this position is to found in the writings of the 3rd-
4th century Eusebius Pamphili, Bishop of Cæsarea and his followers.56 Important in this
respect – if we want to situate these developments in the story of the emergence of
Europe and of its conceptual identity – is that (as Harold Berman argues) this Empire
‘was not a geographical entity, but a military and spiritual idea’.57
So much – though there is of course very much more to be said – on Roman law. Let
me now summarize the line of thought which I have presented.
Firstly, the presently fashionable doctrine of contractual governance is based on a
philosophically dubious notion of contract and results in an equally dubious theory of
the State;
Secondly, conceivably more interesting schemes for improving our understanding
of on the one hand contract, on the other hand the State and its principles of opera-
tion, as well as the functioning of government and law, are to be found in the histori-
cal texts, for example the above-mentioned late-Roman imperial, orientally-inspired
political and constitutional theories. Indeed, we should here add that the Byzantine
accounts are of particular interest in this connexion. Just because they focus on the
extreme case – for instance that of the Emperor as God’s viceroy and the like – they
throw light on the everyday case: ours.
These are all immensely rich elements in the European tradition of political and
legal thought – but they are underexplored in the academic research and debate of our
time.
Leiden University already has a number of institutions and persons doing important
work on varied aspects of European history, politics and law. I should like finally to
make a plea for an intensification of this work: Leiden is in an especially favourable
position to make a highly significant contribution to this work of investigation and
reflection, not just within the academic community but in collaboration with circles in
European politics, administration and the private sector. Let us try in this spirit to make
our contribution – as another kind of champion for the whole of Europe – to lifting
some of the fog.
* * *
Mijnheer de Rector Magnificus, leden van het College van Bestuur van de Universiteit Leiden:
Ik dank u zeer voor het in mij gestelde vertrouwen dat u met het benoemingsbesluit
hebt getoond;
Mijnheer de decaan, bestuursleden en leden van de Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid:
Ik ben u veel dank verschuldigd voor uw bereidheid om deze benoeming te realiseren.
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In het bijzonder wil ik dank zeggen aan de voormalige waarnemend decaan, Theo de
Roos, aan Carel Stolker, en aan Andreas Kinneging, die zich persoonlijk hebben ingezet
om de benoeming tot stand te laten komen;
Een speciaal woord van dank gaat uit naar Leiden University Worldwide Programs –
LUWP – en zijn directeur, Maurits van Rooijen, die onmisbare steun heeft verleend;
Mijn Nijmeegse faculteit, de Nijmegen School of Management, en haar decaan, Hans
Mastop, ben ik verschuldigd voor de bereidheid om de benoeming in Leiden mogelijk
te maken;
Vele anderen zijn er ook die mij steun hebben verleend, sinds ik – te veel jaren geleden
– naar Leiden ben gekomen als eenvoudige medewerker; om te beginnen met Herman
van Gunsteren, die binnenkort in dit Groot Auditorium zijn afscheidsrede zal uitspre-
ken;
Dames en heren studenten en toehoorders:
Hartelijk dank voor uw aanwezigheid. Dit blijk van belangstelling en vriendschap stel
ik persoonlijk zeer op prijs;
Tenslotte, als laatste maar niet het minste, dank ik mijn familie – Maria, Cecily en
Edwin – die mij steeds hebben bijgestaan. Sine qua mihi nulla voluptas vivere.
Ik heb gezegd.
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